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Abstract
It is widely known that convolutional neural networks
(CNNs) are vulnerable to adversarial examples: images with
imperceptible perturbations crafted to fool classifiers. How-
ever, interpretability of these perturbations is less explored
in the literature. This work aims to better understand the
roles of adversarial perturbations and provide visual explana-
tions from pixel, image and network perspectives. We show
that adversaries have a promotion-suppression effect (PSE)
on neurons’ activations and can be primarily categorized
into three types: i) suppression-dominated perturbations that
mainly reduce the classification score of the true label, ii)
promotion-dominated perturbations that focus on boosting
the confidence of the target label, and iii) balanced pertur-
bations that play a dual role in suppression and promotion.
We also provide image-level interpretability of adversarial
examples. This links PSE of pixel-level perturbations to class-
specific discriminative image regions localized by class ac-
tivation mapping (Zhou et al. 2016). Further, we examine
the adversarial effect through network dissection (Bau et al.
2017), which offers concept-level interpretability of hidden
units. We show that there exists a tight connection between
the units’ sensitivity to adversarial attacks and their inter-
pretability on semantic concepts. Lastly, we provide some
new insights from our interpretation to improve the adver-
sarial robustness of networks.
1 Introduction
Adversarial examples are inputs crafted with the intention
of fooling machine learning models (Carlini et al. 2016;
Kurakin, Goodfellow, and Bengio 2016; Athalye, Carlini,
and Wagner 2018; Xu et al. 2019a). Many existing works
have shown that CNNs are vulnerable to adversarial ex-
amples with human imperceptible pixel-level perturbations.
Different types of adversarial attacks were proposed with
a high success rate of mis-classification. However, under-
standing these attacks and further interpreting their effects
are so far less explored in the literature. In this work, we
attempt to study some fundamental questions as follows: a)
How to interpret the mechanism of adversarial perturbations
at pixel and image levels? b) Rather than attack generation,
how to explain the effectiveness of different adversarial at-
tacks? c) How to explore the adversarial effects on the inter-
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Figure 1: Explanation of adversarial perturbations produced by the
C&W attack (Carlini and Wagner 2017b). The first column shows
the original image (with true label ‘Japanese spaniel’) and its ad-
versarial example (with target label ‘bullfrog’). The second column
demonstrates CAM of the original image with respect to the true la-
bel and CAM of the adversarial example with respect to the target
label. At the third column, the adversarial perturbations are over-
laid on CAM, and their effects are categorized by our approach:
suppression-dominated perturbations (white, at the face of spaniel),
promotion-dominated perturbations (black, at the face of bullfrog),
and balance-dominated perturbations (gray).
nal response of CNNs? And d) how does the interpretability
of adversarial examples help robustness?
Contributions. First, we study the sensitivity and func-
tionality of pixel-level perturbations on image classification.
Unlike adversarial saliency maps (ASMs) (Papernot et al.
2016a), our proposed sensitivity measure takes into account
the dependency among pixels that contribute simultaneously
to the classification confidence. We uncover the promotion-
suppression effect (PSE) of adversarial perturbations. We
group the adversaries into three types: a) suppression-
dominated perturbations that mainly reduce the classifica-
tion score of the true label, b) promotion-dominated pertur-
bations that focus on boosting the confidence of the target
label, and c) balance-dominated perturbations that play a
dual role in suppression and promotion.
Second, we associate PSE of pixel-level perturbations
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with image-level interpretability based on class activation
map (CAM) (Zhou et al. 2016). We show that the adver-
sarial pattern can be interpreted using the class-specific dis-
criminative image regions. Figure 1 presents an example of
the C&W adversarial attack (Carlini and Wagner 2017b),
where suppression- and promotion-dominated perturbations
are matched to the discriminative regions of the natural im-
age (with respect to the true label ‘Japanese spaniel’) and
those of the adversarial example (with respect to the tar-
get label ‘bullfrog’), respectively. We also show that the
CAM-based image-level interpretability provides a means
to evaluate the efficacy of attack generation methods. Al-
though some works (Selvaraju et al. 2017; Xiao et al. 2018;
Xu et al. 2019b) attempted to connect adversarial examples
with CAM, they mainly focused on the visualization of ad-
versarial examples.
Third, we present the first attempt to analyze the effect
of adversarial examples on the internal representations of
CNNs using the network dissection technique (Bau et al.
2017). We show a tight connection between the sensitivity
of hidden units of CNNs and their interpretability on seman-
tic concepts, which are also aligned with PSE. Furthermore,
we provide some insights on how to improve robustness by
leveraging our interpretation of adversarial examples.
Related Works. The effectiveness of adversarial attacks
(Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy 2015; Kurakin, Goodfel-
low, and Bengio 2017; Carlini and Wagner 2017b; Chen
et al. 2017; Xu et al. 2019b; Ye et al. 2019) are com-
monly measured from attack success rate as well as `p-
norm distortion between natural and adversarial examples.
Some works (Karmon, Zoran, and Goldberg 2018; Brown
et al. 2017) generated adversarial attacks by adding un-
constrained noise patches, which are different from norm-
ball constrained attacks, leading to higher noise visibility.
Rather than attack generation, the goal of this paper is to
understand and explain the effect of imperceptible perturba-
tions. Here we focus on norm-ball constrained adversarial
attacks. Many defense methods have also been developed
against adversarial attacks. Examples include defensive dis-
tillation (Papernot et al. 2016b), random mask (Luo et al.
2018), training with a Lipschitz regularized loss function
(Finlay, Oberman, and Abbasi 2018), and robust adversar-
ial training using min-max optimization (Madry et al. 2017;
Sinha, Namkoong, and Duchi 2018).
Although the study on attack generation and defense has
attracted an increasing amount of attention, interpretability
of these examples is less explored in the literature. Some
preliminary works (Papernot et al. 2016a; Yu, Dong, and
Chen 2018) were made on evaluating the impact of pixel-
level adversarial perturbations on changing the classification
results. In (Papernot et al. 2016a), Jacobian-based ASM was
introduced to greedily perturb pixels that significantly con-
tribute to the likelihood of target classification. However,
ASM implicitly ignores the coupling effect of pixel-level
perturbations, and it becomes less effective when an image
has multiple color channels given the fact that each color
channel is treated independently. As an extension of (Pa-
pernot et al. 2016a), the work (Yu, Dong, and Chen 2018)
proposed an adversarial saliency prediction (ASP) method,
which characterizes the divergence of the ASM distribution
and the distribution of perturbations.
Both ASM (Papernot et al. 2016a) and ASP (Yu, Dong,
and Chen 2018) have helped humans to understand how ad-
versarial perturbations made to inputs will affect the out-
puts of neural networks, however, it remains difficult to vi-
sually explain the mechanism of the adversary given the
fact that pixel-level perturbations are small and impercep-
tible to humans. The work (Selvaraju et al. 2017; Xiao et al.
2018) adopted CAM to visualize the change of attention re-
gions of the natural and adversarial images, but the use of
CAM is preliminary and its connection with interpretabil-
ity of pixel-level perturbations is missing. The most relevant
work to ours is (Xu et al. 2019b), which proposed an inter-
pretability score via ASM and CAM. However, it focuses on
generating structure-driven adversarial attacks by promoting
group sparsity of perturbations. In contrast, we provide more
thorough and insightful quantitative analysis. In particular,
we associate the class-specific discriminative image regions
with pixel-level perturbations. We also show that the CAM-
based interpretability provides means to examine the effec-
tiveness of perturbation patterns.
From the network perspective, the work (Dong et al.
2017) investigated the effect of an ensemble attack on neu-
rons’ activations. In (Carter et al. 2019), Activation Atlas
was proposed to show feature visualizations of basis neurons
as well as common combinations of neurons. And it was ap-
plied to visualizing the effect of adversarial patches (rather
than norm-ball constrained adversarial perturbations). Dif-
ferent from (Carter et al. 2019; Dong et al. 2017), we
adopt the technique of network dissection (Bau et al. 2017;
2019) to peer into the effect of adversarial examples on the
concept-level interpretability of hidden units.
2 Preliminaries: Attack, Dataset, and Model
Let x0 ∈ Rn denote the natural image, and δ be adversarial
perturbation to be designed. Here, unless specified other-
wise, the vector representation of an image is used. The ad-
versarial example is then given by x′ = x0 + δ. By setting
the input of the CNNs as x0 and x′, the classifier will predict
the true label t0 and the target label t (6= t0), respectively. To
find the minimum adversarial perturbation δ for misclassifi-
cation from t0 to t, a so-called norm-ball constrained attack
technique is commonly used; Examples considered in this
paper include IFGSM (Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy
2015), C&W (Carlini and Wagner 2017a), EAD (Chen et
al. 2017), and Str attacks (Xu et al. 2019b). We refer read-
ers to Appendix 1 for more details on attack generation.
Our work attempts to interpret adversarial examples from
the pixel (Sec. 3), image (Sec. 4) and network (Sec. 5)
perspective. At pixel and image levels, we generate ad-
versarial examples from ImageNet under network models
Resnet v2 101 (He et al. 2016) and Inception v3 (Szegedy
et al. 2016). At the network level, we generate adversarial
examples from the Broadly and Densely Labeled Dataset
(Broden) (Bau et al. 2017), which contains examples with
pixel-level concept annotations related to multiple concept
categories including color, material, texture, part, scene and
object. The considered network model is Resnet 152 (He et
al. 2016).
3 Effects of Pixel-level Perturbations
We begin by quantifying how much impact a perturbation
could make on prediction confidence. We use the change of
logit scores with respect to (w.r.t.) both correct and target la-
bels to measure such an effect. This is in the similar spirit
of the C&W attack loss (Carlini and Wagner 2017a) but we
focus on grid region-level perturbations as well as the leave-
one-out interpretability criterion (Yang et al. 2019). We build
a pixel-level sensitivity measure that can be further used for
image-level sensitivity analysis. We aim to answer the ques-
tions: How to tag the role of pixel-level perturbations? And
how is the perturbation sensitivity associated with the per-
turbation strength?
Recall that x = x0 denotes the natural image, and x = x′
corresponds to the adversarial example. We divide an image
x into m grid regions with coordinate sets {Gi}mi=1, where
each Gi contains a group of pixels, and ∪mi=1Gi = [n]. Here
[n] denotes the overall set of pixels {1, 2, . . . , n}. We note
that a proper size of a grid region facilities visual explana-
tion on semantic image sub-regions and save computation
cost. So we set it as 13 × 13 for ImageNet empirically and
also consistent with (Xu et al. 2019b). Let δGi ∈ Rn be
the perturbation at the grid region Gi, where [δGi ]j = δj if
j ∈ Gi, and 0 otherwise. Here [a]i or ai denotes the ith el-
ement of a. We next propose a sensitivity measure of δGi ,
which characterizes the impact of pixel-level perturbations
on the prediction confidence (in terms of logit score).
Definition 1 (Sensitivity measure of perturbations): The
impact of perturbation δGi on prediction is measured from
two aspects: i) the logit change d0,i w.r.t. the true label t0,
and ii) the logit change dt,i w.r.t. the target label t. That is,
d0,i = max{Z(x′ − δGi)t0 − Z(x′)t0 , ξ}, (1)
dt,i = max{Z(x′)t − Z(x′ − δGi)t, ξ}, (2)
si = d0,i + dt,i (3)
for i ∈ [m], where Z(x)j gives the logit score with respect
to class j, and ξ > 0 is a small positive number.
The rationale behind Definition 1 is that the adversarial
example x′, when it is successfully generated, makes the
network misclassified from t0 to t. Thus, we assign each
δGi i) the change in the confidence of the true label t0
and ii) the change in the confidence of the target label t
when δGi is removed from the adversarial example x
′. The
sensitivity measure in Definition 1 enjoys the similar spirit
of leave-one-out interpretability (Zeiler and Fergus 2014;
Yang et al. 2019), but the latter focuses on the prediction
sensitivity of a single class rather than both t0 and t.
In Definition 1, a large d0,i implies a more significant role
of a perturbation δGi on suppressing the classification result
away from t0. By contrast, dt,i measures the effect of δGi on
promoting the prediction confidence of the target label. The
overall adversarial significance si is the combined effect of
d0,i and dt,i. Thus, pixels with small values of si play less
significant roles in misleading classifiers. In (1)–(2), we use
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Figure 2: Illustration on sensitivity measure via the ‘badger’-to-
‘computer’ adversarial example generated by C&W attack. Here
the true label is ‘badger’ and the target label is ‘computer’. The
first column shows the adversarial example and the heat map of
`2-norm distortion at each grid region, i.e., {‖δGi‖2}. The second
column presents `p norm of δGi (p = 2,∞), sensitivity scores d0,i
and dt,i, and PSR ri versus the index of grid regions, where the
dash lines correspond to the PSR threshold ±1.
ξ to get rid of the negative values of d0,i and dt,i, i.e., the
insignificant cases for the adversary.
With the aid of {d0,i} and {dt,i} in Definition 1, we define
a promotion-suppression ratio (PSR)
ri = log2 (dt,i/d0,i) , i ∈ [m], (4)
which describes the mechanism of δGi on misclassification.
In (4), the logarithm is taken for ease of studying PSR un-
der different regimes, e.g, ri ≥ 1 implies that dt,i ≥ 2d0,i.
Here we categorize the effect of δGi into three types. If ri <−1, then we call δGi a suppression-dominated perturbation,
which is mainly used to reduce the classification logit of the
true label. If ri > 1, then we call δGi a promotion-dominated
perturbation, which is mainly used to boost the classifica-
tion logit of the target label. If ri ∈ [−1, 1], then we call
δGi a balance-dominated perturbation that plays a dual role
in suppression and promotion. Although different threshold
values on ri can be used, we choose ±1 for ease of visual
explanation. In Figure 2 we illustrate the sensitivity mea-
sures (1)-(4) through an adversarial example generated by
the C&W attack (Carlini and Wagner 2017b). As we can see,
either d0,i or dt,i (an thus si) is correlated with the perturba-
tion strength at each grid region (in terms of the `p norm of
δGi ). Also, PSR implies that most of perturbations in this ex-
ample contribute to promoting the prediction confidence of
the target class. This will also be verified by the image-level
interpretability in Figure 4.
The example of the C&W attack in Figure 2 suggests that
the strength of pixel-level perturbations (e.g., in terms of `2
norm) might be strongly correlated with the input sensitivity
scores. For a more thorough quantitative analysis, we exam-
ine 5000 adversarial examples generated by 4 attack meth-
ods under 2 network models from ImageNet. In Figure 3,
we present Pearson correlation and Kendall rank correlation
between the distortion strength {‖δGi‖2} and the proposed
sensitivity scores {si} given by (3). We see that C&W, EAD
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Figure 3: Correlation between sensitivity scores {si} and `2
distortion values {‖δGi‖2}. Left: Pearson correlation. Right:
Kendall rank correlation.
and Str attacks exhibit a relatively stronger correlation than
IFGSM since the latter perturbs every pixel due to the use
of sign operation, while the former attacks are generated by
`1 and `2-norm penalized optimization methods that often
yield non-uniform and sparser perturbations. For example,
the sparest Str-attack has the highest correlation since it per-
turbs discriminative image regions of high sensitivity (Xu et
al. 2019b). In the next section, we will further connect pixel-
level perturbations with discriminative image regions.
4 Interpreting Adversarial Perturbations via
Class Activation Map (CAM)
CAM (Zhou et al. 2016) and other visual explanation tech-
niques such as GradCAM (Selvaraju et al. 2017), Grad-
CAM++ (Chattopadhay et al. 2018) and RISE (Petsiuk, Das,
and Saenko 2018) build a localizable deep representation,
which exposes the implicit attention of CNNs on a labelled
image (Zhou et al. 2016). In this section, we analyze the
promotion-suppression effect (PSE) of adversarial perturba-
tions via image-level interpretability. We restrict our anal-
ysis to CAM, but can readily be extended to other inter-
pretability methods.
Let F (x, c) denote the CAM for image x w.r.t. the class
label c. The strength of a spatial element in F (x, c) charac-
terizes the importance of the activation at this spatial loca-
tion for classifying x to the class c. Thus, one may wonder
the relationship between adversarial examples and discrim-
inative regions localized by CAM. Given natural and ad-
versarial examples, CAMs of our interest include F (x0, t0),
F (x′, t0), F (x0, t) and F (x′, t) with respect to both the cor-
rect and the target labels; see Figure 4 for an example and
Figure A2 for more results. Figure 4 suggests that the ef-
fect of adversarial perturbations can be visually explained
through the class-specific discriminative image regions lo-
calized by CAM. Compared F (x0, t0) with F (x′, t0), the
most discriminative region w.r.t. (x0, t0) is suppressed as δ
is added to x0. By contrast, the difference between F (x0, t)
and F (x′, t) implies that the discriminative region of x0 un-
der t is enhanced after injecting δ.
We next employ the so-called interpretability score (IS)
(Xu et al. 2019b) to quantify how the adversarial perturba-
tion δ is associated with the most discriminative image re-
gion found by the CAM F (x, c). More formally, let B(x, c)
denote the Boolean map that highlights the most discrimina-
F (x′, t0) F (x0, t0) x0 F (x0, t) F (x′, t)
t0: badger t: computer
Figure 4: Visualizing CAMs of natural image and its adversarial
example (generated by C&W attack) w.r.t. the true label ‘badger’
and the target label ‘computer’, respectively. The heat map color
from blue to red represents the least and the most discriminative
region localized by CAM, respectively. Here the values of CAMs
are normalized w.r.t. the largest value cross CAMs.
tive region,
[B(x, c)]i =
{
1 [F (x, c)]i ≥ ν
0 otherwise, (5)
where ν > 0 is a given threshold, and [F (x, c)]i is the ith
element of F (x, c). The IS of adversarial perturbations w.r.t.
(x, c) is defined by
IS(δ) = ‖B(x, c) ◦ δ‖2/‖δ‖2. (6)
where ◦ is the element-wise product. Figure A1 shows the
sensitivity of IS against the hyperparameter ν. Not surpris-
ingly, the threshold ν cannot be too large or too small to
highlight the proper discriminative image regions. We set it
as 70%-quantile of weights in a CAM.
In (6), IS(δ) → 1 if the discriminative region perfectly
predicts the locations of adversarial perturbations. By con-
trast, if IS(δ)→ 0, then adversarial perturbations cannot be
interpreted by CAM. In Figure 5, we examine IS for 4 attack
types via CAM, GradCAM++ and RISE w.r.t. (x0, t0) and
(x′, t). We see that IS is not quite sensitive to the choice of
interpretability methods, since it is built on Boolean localiz-
able maps, which enjoy a large overlapping among different
visual explanation tools. We also see that Str and IFGSM
yield the best and the worst IS, respectively. These results
are consistent with Figure 3: Str-attack tends to perturb local
semantic image regions, while IFGSM perturbs every pixel
due to the use of sign-based perturbation direction.
We recall that PSR in (4) categorizes {δGi} into three
types: suppression-dominated perturbations, promotion-
dominated perturbations, and balanced perturbations. In
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Figure 5: IS under 4 attack types & 3 visual explanation
methods on Resnet. Left: IS defined on F (x0, t0). Right:
IS defined on F (x′, t). Each box plot represents IS values of
5000 natural/adversarial examples from ImageNet.
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Figure 6: Interpreting adversarial perturbations via CAM and
PSR. For PSR, only the top 70% most significant perturbed grids
ranked by {si} (3) are shown. The white and black colors represent
the suppression-dominated regions (ri < −1) and the promotion-
dominated regions (ri > 1), respectively. The gray color corre-
sponds to balance-dominated perturbations (ri ∈ [−1, 1]). And the
red box represents the dominated adversarial effect.
Figure 6, we see that the locations and the promotion-
suppression roles of adversarial perturbations are well
matched to the discriminative regions of F (x0, t0) and
F (x′, t). In particular, if there exists a large overlapping be-
tween F (x0, t0) and F (x′, t), then the balanced perturba-
tions are desired since perturbing a single pixel can play
a dual role in suppression and promotion. Toward deeper
insights, we investigate how the adversary makes an im-
pact on attacking a single image with multiple target la-
bels (Figure 7) as well as attacking multiple images with the
same source and target label (Figure A4). We see that the
promotion-dominated perturbation is adaptive to the change
of the target label in Figure 7. Moreover, the same source-
target label pair enforces a similar effect of adversarial per-
turbations on attacking different images in Figure A4. Addi-
tional results can be found in Appendix 2.
Insights on how CAM constrains effectiveness of adver-
sarial attacks. We have previously shown that CAM can be
used to localize class-specific discriminative image regions.
We now consider two types of CAM-based operations to re-
fine an adversarial perturbation pattern: (a) removing less
sensitive perturbations quantified by si in (3), and (b) en-
forcing perturbations in the most discriminative regions only
w.r.t. the true label, namely, B(x0, t0) in (5). We represent
the refinement operations (a) and (b) through the constraint
adv. F (x′, t) & PSR adv. F (x′, t) & PSR
Figure 7: Interpreting adversarial examples of the original image
‘Japanese spaniel’ in Figure 1 w.r.t. different target labels ‘acoustic
guitar’ and ‘desktop computer’ using CAM and PSR.
sets of pixels S1 = {∀i | si > β} for a positive threshold β
and S2 = {∀i | [B(x0, t0)]i > 0}, where β is set to filter per-
turbations of less than 1 − ν = 30% cumulative sensitivity
scores. The refined adversarial examples are then generated
by performing the existing attack methods with an additional
projection on the sparse constraints given by S1 and S2. We
refer readers to Appendix 3 for more details.
We find that it is possible to obtain a more effective at-
tack by perturbing much less pixels of high sensitivity scores
under S1, but without increasing `p perturbation strength
(Table A1). For attacks with refinement under S2, Figure 8
shows that perturbing pixels under only a suppression-
dominated adversarial pattern S2 w.r.t. the true label is not
effective: If we restrict perturbations under S2, then the re-
fined attack leads to a much larger `2 distortion. That is be-
cause the perturbation δ originally plays a role in promoting
the confidence of the target label, which corresponds to a
class-specific discriminative region different from S2.
original
CAM + PSRs w.r.t.
adv. image & target label
perturbations
(Str-attack)
CAM w.r.t.
ori. image & true label
CAM + PSRs w.r.t.
refined attack & true label
perturbations
(refined Str-attack)
Figure 8: The ‘flatworm’-to-‘knot’ adversarial example (gener-
ated by str-Attack) with and without refinement under S2. The first
row presents the original image, PSRs overlaid on CAM of the ad-
versarial example w.r.t. the target label ‘knot’, and the `2-norm dis-
tortion of adversarial perturbations. The second row presents S2
given by CAM of the original image w.r.t. the true label ‘flatworm’,
and the refined attack under S2. Note that this refinement leads to
much larger `2 distortion (max. value 1.2) against the unrefined
attack (max. value 0.25); see the third column.
5 Seeing Effects of Adversarial
Perturbations from Network Dissection
In this section, we examine the promotion-suppression ef-
fect of adversarial perturbations on the internal response of
CNNs by leveraging network dissection (Bau et al. 2017).
We show that there exists a connection between the sensitiv-
ity of units (a unit refer to a channel-wise feature map) and
their concept-level interpretability.
We begin by reviewing the main idea of network dissec-
tion; see more details in (Bau et al. 2017). Interpretability
measured by network dissection refers to the alignment be-
tween individual hidden units and a set of semantic concepts
provided by the broadly and densely labeled dataset Bro-
den. Different from other datasets, examples in Broden con-
tain pixel-level concept annotation, ranging from low-level
concepts such as color and texture to higher-level concepts
such as material, part, object and scene. Network dissection
builds a correspondence between a hidden unit’s activation
and its interpretability on semantic concepts. More formally,
the interpretability of unit (IoU) k w.r.t. the concept c is de-
fined by (Bau et al. 2017)
IoU(k, c) =
∑
x∈D |Mk(x) ∩ Lc(x)|∑
x∈D |Mk(x) ∪ Lc(x)|
, (7)
where D denotes Broden, and | · | is the cardinality of a
set. In (7), Mk(x) is a binary segmentation of the activa-
tion map of unit k, which gives the representative region of
x at k. Here the activation is scaled up to the input resolu-
tion using bilinear interpolation, denoted by Sk(x), and then
truncated using the top 5% quantile (dataset-level) threshold
Tk. That is, Mk(x) = Sk(x) ≥ Tk, namely, the (i, j)th
element of Mk(x) is 1 if the (i, j)th element of Sk(x) is
greater than or equal to Tk, and 0 otherwise. In (7), Lc(x) is
the input-resolution annotation mask, provided by Broden,
for the concept c w.r.t. x. Since one unit might detect multi-
ple concepts, the interpretability of a unit is summarized as
IoU(k) = (1/|C|)∑c IoU(k, c), where |C| denotes the total
number of concept labels.
We next investigate the effect of adversarial perturbations
on the internal response of CNNs by leveraging network
dissection. We produce adversarial examples D′ from Bro-
den using the PGD untargeted attack method (Madry et al.
2017). Given adversarial examples {x′ ∈ D′}, we charac-
terize the sensitivity of unit k (to adversarial perturbations)
via the change of activation segmentation
v(k) := E(x,x′)
[∥∥Mk(x)−Mk(x′)∥∥2] , (8)
where (x,x′) is a pair of natural and adversarial examples,
and the expectation is taken over a certain distribution of
our interest, e.g., the entire dataset or data of fixed source-
target labels. In (8), we adopt the activation segmentation
Mk rather than the activation map Sk since the former high-
lights the representative region of an activation map without
inducing the layer-wise magnitude bias.
Given the per-unit sensitivity measure v(k) and inter-
pretability measure IoU(k), we may ask whether or not the
sensitive units (to adversarial perturbations) exhibit strong
interpretability. To answer this question, we conduct the sta-
tistical significance test by contrasting the IoU of the top N
ranked sensitive units with the IoU distribution of randomly
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Figure 9: Sensitivity and interpretability. (a) p-value of inter-
pretability of top N sensitive units to adversarial attacks in
Resnet 152, where the presented layers include conv2 3 (256
units), conv3 8 (512 units), conv4 36 (1024 units) and conv5 3
(2048 units). (b) Number of concept detectors among topN = 100
sensitive units per layer for each concept category.
selected N units. Formally, the p-value is the probability of
observing
∑
k IoU(k) when k is from top N sensitive units
ranked by v(k) in the background IoU distribution when N
units are randomly picked. The smaller the p-value is, the
more significant the connection between sensitivity and in-
terpretability is.
We present the significance test of the interpretability of
top N ∈ {10, 20, 30, 50, 80, 100} sensitive units against the
layer index of Resnet 152 (Figure 9-a). We also show the
number of concept detectors1 among top N = 100 sensitive
units versus layers for every concept category (Figure 9-b).
Here we denote by convi j the last convolutional layer of jth
building block at the ith layer in Resnet 152 (He et al. 2016).
It is seen from Figure 9-a that there exists a strong connec-
tion between the sensitivity of units and their interpretability
since p < 0.05 in most of cases. By fixing the layer num-
ber, such a connection becomes more significant as N in-
creases: Most of the top 100 sensitive units are interpretable,
although the top 10 sensitive units might not be the same top
10 interpretable units. By fixing N , we observe that deep
layers (conv4 36 and conv5 3) exhibit stronger connection
between sensitivity and interpretability compared to shallow
layers (conv2 3 and conv3 8). That is because the change
of activation induced by adversarial attacks at shallow lay-
ers could be subtle and are less detectable in terms of in-
terpretability. Indeed, Figure 9-b shows that more high-level
concept detectors (e.g., object and part) emerge in conv4 36
and conv5 3 while low-level concepts (e.g., color and tex-
ture) dominate at lower layers.
To peer into the impact of adversarial perturbations on in-
dividual images, we examine how the representation of con-
cept detectors change while facing adversarial examples by
attacking images from the same true class t0 to the same
target class t. Here the representation of a concept detec-
tor is visualized by the segmented input image determined
by Mk(x). In Figure 10, we show two examples of attacks:
‘table lamp’-to-‘studio couch, day bed’ and ‘airliner’-to-
‘seashore, seacoast’. We first note that most of low-level
concepts (e.g., color and texture) are detected at shallow lay-
ers, consistent with Figure 9-b. In the attack ‘table lamp’-
to-‘studio couch, day bed’, the color ‘orange’ detected at
1A concept detector refers to a unit with the top ranked concept
satisfying maxc IoU(k, c) > 0.04 (Bau et al. 2017).
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Figure 10: Visualizing impact of original (Ori) & adversarial (Adv) examples on the response of concept detectors identified by network
dissection at 4 representative layers in Resnet. (top) attack ‘table lamp’-to-‘studio couch, day bed’, (bottom) attack ‘airliner’-to-‘seashore,
seacoast’. In both top and bottom sub-figures, the first row presents unit indices together with detected top ranked concept labels and categories
(in the format ‘concept label’-‘concept category’). The last two rows present the response of concept detectors visualized by the segmented
input image, where the segmentation is given by Mk(x) corresponding to the top ranked concept at each unit.
conv2 3 is less expressed for the adversarial image against
the natural image. This aligns with human perception since
‘orange’ is related to ‘light’ and thus ‘table lamp’. By con-
trast, in the attack ‘airliner’-to-‘seashore, seacoast’, the color
‘blue’ is well detected at both natural and adversarial im-
ages, since ‘blue’ is associated with both ‘sky’ for ‘airliner’
and ‘sea’ for ‘seashore’. We also note that high-level con-
cepts (e.g., part and object) dominate at deeper layers. At
conv5 3, the expression of object concepts (e.g., lamp and
airplane) relevant to the true label is suppressed. Meanwhile,
the expression of object concepts (e.g., sofa and beach) rel-
evant to the target label is promoted. This precisely reflects
the activation promotion-suppression effect induced by ad-
versarial perturbations. In Figure A8, we connect images in
Figure 10 to PSR and CAM based visual explanation.
6 Insights of Interpretability for Improving
Adversarial Robustness
First, PSE explains the effectiveness of detecting adversar-
ial examples with feature attribution (Yang et al. 2019). It
was shown in (Yang et al. 2019) that the input attribution
scores of an adversarial example obtained by the leave-one-
out method (Zeiler and Fergus 2014) yields a significantly
larger variance than the case of natural image. The presence
of a significant change on the probability of the top-1 class,
when a pixel is removed from an adversarial example, is ex-
plainable. By PSE, the possible reason is that the seemingly
random perturbation could play a critical role in promoting
the confidence of the target label, e.g., Figure 7.
Second, hiding adversarial examples from CAM may be
not easy. It was shown in (Zhang et al. 2018) that adversarial
examples can be crafted to fool CNNs, and at the same time
keep their CAMs (w.r.t. the top-1 prediction class) intact.
However, our results in Sec. 4 suggest that the discrepancy
between CAMs of natural and adversarial examples exists
w.r.t. both the true and the target label. Thus, we need to re-
think whether or not it is easy to hide adversarial examples
from network interpretation defined under the two-class or
even all-class CAM distortion.
Third, network dissection implies the method of neuron
masking to improve robustness. Since the sensitive units to
adversarial perturbations exhibit strong interpretability, one
could mitigate the effect of adversaries by masking these
sensitive neurons with interpretation toward the target label.
Our preliminary results in Table A2 of Appendix 4 show that
the suggested neuron masking improves robustness at the
cost of slight degradation on clean test accuracy.
7 Conclusions
In this work, we made a significant effort to understand the
mechanism of adversarial attacks and provided its explana-
tion at pixel, image and network levels. We showed that ad-
versarial attacks play a significant role in activation promo-
tion and suppression. The promotion-suppression effect is
strongly associated with class-specific discriminative image
regions. We also demonstrated that the interpretable adver-
sarial pattern constrains the effectiveness of adversarial at-
tacks. We further provided the first analysis of adversarial
examples through network dissection, which builds the con-
nection between the units’ sensitivity to imperceptible per-
turbations and their interpretability on semantic concepts.
In the future, we would like to develop interpretability-
driven defensive methods and consider the scenario of attack
against interpretability, not just prediction.
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Appendices of Interpreting Adversarial
Examples by Activation Promotion and
Suppression
1 Attack Generation
IFGSM attack (Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy 2015;
Kurakin, Goodfellow, and Bengio 2017) produces adver-
sarial examples by performing iterative fast gradient sign
method (IFGSM), followed by an -ball clipping. IFGSM
attacks are designed to be fast, rather than optimal in terms
of minimum perturbation.
C&W (Carlini and Wagner 2017a), EAD (Chen et al.
2017), and Str- attacks (Xu et al. 2019b) can be unified in
the following optimization framework,
minimize
δ
f(x0 + δ, t) + λg(δ)
subject to (x0 + δ) ∈ [0, 1]n, h(δ) ≤ 0, (9)
where f(x0 + δ, t) denotes a loss function for targeted mis-
classification, g(δ) is a regularization function that penalizes
the norm of adversarial perturbations, λ > 0 is a regulariza-
tion parameter, and h(δ) places optionally hard constraints
on δ. All C&W, EAD and Str- attacks enjoy a similar loss
function
f(x0 + δ, t) = c ·max{max
j 6=t
Z(x0 + δ)j
− Z(x0 + δ)t,−κ}, (10)
where Z(x)j is the j-th element of logits Z(x), namely, the
output before the last softmax layer in CNNs, and κ is a con-
fidence parameter. Clearly, as κ increases, the minimization
of f would reach the target label with high confidence. In
this paper, we set κ = 1 by default. It is worth mentioning
that problem (9) can be efficiently solved via alternating di-
rection method of multipliers (ADMM) (Boyd et al. 2011;
Xu et al. 2019b), regardless of whether or not g(δ) is differ-
entiable.
C&W attack (Carlini and Wagner 2017a) adopts the `p
norm to penalize the strength of adversarial perturbations
δ, namely, g(δ) = ‖δ‖p and h(δ) = 0 in (9), where
p ∈ {0, 2,∞}. In practice, the squared `2 norm is commonly
used.
EAD attack (Chen et al. 2017) specifies the regular-
ization term λg(δ) as an elastic-net regularizer λ1‖δ‖22 +
λ2‖δ‖1 in (9), and h(δ) = 0. It has empirically shown that
the use of elastic-net regularizer improves the transferability
of adversarial examples.
Str-attack (Xu et al. 2019b) takes into account the group-
level sparsity of adversarial perturbations by choosing g(δ)
as the group Lasso penalty (Yuan and Lin 2006). In the
mean time, it constrains the pixel-level perturbation by set-
ting h(δ) = ‖δ‖∞ −  for a tolerance  > 0.
2 CAM-based Interpretation
Sensitivity of hyper-parameter ν to IS. Figure A1 presents
IS against ν for IFGSM, C&W, EAD and Str attacks.
Additional results on CAM-based interpretation. In Fig-
ure A2, we demonstrate more examples of class-specific dis-
criminative regions visualized by CAM, namely, F (x′, t0),
F (x0, t0), x0, F (x0, t), F (x′, t). In Figure A3, we fix the
orginal image together with its true and target labels to vi-
sualize the difference of attack methods through CAM. In
Figure A4, we present the adversarial attack of multiple im-
ages with a fixed source-target label pair. As we can see, the
balance-dominated perturbation pattern appears at the dis-
criminative region of ‘eagle’. In Figure A5, we present the
‘hamster’-to-‘cup’ example, where objects of the original
label and the target label exist simultaneously. We observe
that the adversary shows suppression on the discriminative
region of the original label and promotion on the discrim-
inative region of the target label. Compared to the C&W
attack, Str-attack is more effective in both suppressing and
promotion since it perturbs less pixels. In Figure A6, images
involve more heterogeneous and complex backgrounds. As
we can see, an effective adversarial attack (e.g., Str-attack)
perturbs less but more meaningful pixels, which have a bet-
ter correspondence with the discriminative image regions
of the original and target classes. In Figure A7, we present
a ‘hippocampus’-to-‘streetcar’ example with refined attacks
under S1. As we can see, it is possible to obtain a more ef-
fective attack by perturbing less but ‘right’ pixels (i.e., with
better correspondence with discriminative image regions).
3 Effectiveness of Refined Adversarial
Pattern
We consider the following unified optimization problem to
refine adversarial attacks
minimize
δ
f(x0 + δ, t) + λg(δ)
subject to (x0 + δ) ∈ [0, 1]n, h(δ) ≤ 0
δi = 0, if i /∈ Sk, k = 1 or 2,
(11)
where we represent the refinement operations (a) and (b)
through the constraint sets S1 = {∀i | si > β} for a posi-
tive threshold β 2 and S2 = {∀i | [B(x0, t0)]i > 0}. In S1,
si defined by (3) characterizes the strength of the adversar-
ial pattern. In S2, B(x0, t0) defined by (5) localizes pixels
corresponding to the most discriminative region associated
with the true label. Problem (11) can similarly be solved as
(9), with an additional projection on the sparse constraints
given by S1 and S2.
We present the effectiveness of attacks with refinement
under S1 in Table A1. Here the effectiveness of an attack is
characterized by its attack success rate (ASR) as well as `p-
norm distortions. We find that many pixel-level adversarial
perturbations are redundant, in terms of the reduction in the
`0 norm3 of δ, which can be removed without losing effec-
tiveness in the attack success rate and `p-norm distortions
for p > 0.
4 Interpretation via Network Dissection
In Figure A8, we connect images in Figure 10 to PSR and
CAM based visual explanation. For example, the suppressed
image region identified by PSR (white color) corresponds
2We sort {si} to {s˜i} in an ascending order, and set β = s˜k
for the smallest k with
∑k
i=1 s˜i/
∑m
i=1 s˜i ≥ 30%. We filter less
significant perturbations under their cumulative power.
3‖x‖0: # of nonzero elements in x.
to the interpretable activation of object concept airplane in
Figure 10. And the promoted image region identified by PSR
(black color) corresponds to the interpretable activation of
scene concept beach.
In Table A2, we report the clean test accuracy (CTA) and
the adversarial test accuracy (ATA) under three masking set-
tings on the last convolutional layer of conv5: a) our pro-
posed masking over top 10 sensitive units with concept-level
interpretability, b) random masking over 10 units, and c) no
masking. ATA is obtained by perturbing 1000 randomly se-
lected test images using k-step PGD attack (Madry et al.
2017), where k ∈ {10, 20, 50, 100}. Our preliminary results
show that the proposed approach yields the highest ATA,
balanced with slight degradation on CTA.
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Figure A1: IS versus ν for 4 attack types.
original label: howler monkey target label: paper towel
score: 5.96 score: 7.82 score: 0.21 score: 7.25
original label: rhinoceros beetle target label: ambulance
score: 3.60 score: 11.73 score: 0.78 score: 4.61
original label: catamaran target label: container ship
score: 6.27 score: 12.41 score: 0.34 score: 7.08
x0F(x0 ,t0)F(x',t0) F(x0 ,t ) F(x',t )
Figure A2: CAMs of two natural/adversarial examples (in
rows), generated by C&W attack, where F (x′, t0), F (x0, t0), x0,
F (x0, t), F (x′, t) are shown from the left to the right at each row.
x0F(x0 ,t0) F(x',t )
original label: plow target label: bathtub
C&W 
EAD 
logit score: 5.82
logit score: 5.46
logit score: 9.89
logit score: 9.89
F(x',t )
logit score: 5.82
logit score: 5.46
original label: plow target label: bathtub
original label: plow IFGSM target label: bathtub
logit score: 12.25logit score: 9.89 logit score: 12.25
original label: plow target label: bathtubStr 
logit score: 8.05logit score: 9.89 logit score: 8.05
Figure A3: Four adversarial examples with CAM visualization
generated by C&W, EAD, Str, and IFGSM attacks, respectively.
Left to right: F (x0, t0), x0, F (x′, t), and overlaid PSR ri on
F (x′, t) at locations of the top 70% most significant perturbed
grids ranked by si. Here CAMs at each row are normalized with
respect to their maximum value.
Figure A4: Multiple images with a fixed source-target label pair:
CAM with respect to the source label ‘bald eagle’ (1 column), orig-
inal image ‘bald eagle’ (2 column), CAM with respect to target
label ‘hen’ together with C&W perturbation patterns (3 column),
which is measured by promotion-suppression ratio (PSR), i.e.
suppression- (white), promotion- (black), and balance-dominated
adversaries (gray).
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Figure A5: Visual explanation of the ‘hamster’-to-‘cup’ example
crafted by C&W and Str-attack, where the true label t0 is ‘hamster’,
and the target label t is ‘cup’. The first row is the natural image
and PSRs over perturbed grids. The second (third) row is CAM
with respect to the column-wise natural/adversarial example and
the row-wise label.
x0 F(x0 ,t0) F(x',t )
C&W 
F(x',t )
original label: Tibetan mastiff target label: streetcar
EAD original label: Tibetan mastiff target label: streetcar
Stroriginal label: Tibetan mastiff target label: streetcar
IFGSMoriginal label: Tibetan mastiff target label: streetcar
x0 F(x0 ,t0) F(x',t )
C&W
F(x',t )
target label: shower curtain
EADoriginal label: French horn target label: shower curtain
Stroriginal label: French horn target label: shower curtain
IFGSMoriginal label: French horn target label: shower curtain
original label: French horn
Figure A6: Attacking images with complex background under C&W, EAD, Str-, and IFGSM attacks.
original C&W EAD Str IFGSM
w
/o
re
fin
e
w
ith
re
fin
e
Figure A7: The ‘hippopotamus’-to-‘streetcar’ adversarial exam-
ple with and without refinement under S1. Here the left-bottom
subplot shows CAM of the original image w.r.t. the true label ‘hip-
popotamus’, and the right subplots present PSRs of unrefined and
refined grid-level perturbations overlaid on CAMs of adversarial
examples w.r.t. the target label ‘streetcar’.
Table A1: Attack performance of adversarial perturbations with and without refinement under S1 over 5000 images.
attack model `0 `1 `2 `∞ ASRoriginal (δ) refine (δS ) original refine original refine original refine refine
IFGSM Resnet 266031 61055 1122.56 176.08 2.625 1.87 0.017 0.035 96.7%Incep. 266026 59881 812.94 155.89 1.926 1.22 0.019 0.033 100%
C&W Resnet 268117 21103 183.65 134.26 0.697 0.727 0.028 0.029 100%Incep. 268123 22495 144.94 96.75 0.650 0.673 0.028 0.034 100%
EAD Resnet 66584 20147 42.57 63.28 1.520 1.233 0.234 0.096 100%Incep. 69677 18855 30.17 45.88 1.289 1.107 0.229 0.083 100%
Str Resnet 30823 18744 119.76 110.54 1.250 1.132 0.105 0.087 100%Incep. 27873 15967 86.55 82.33 1.174 0.985 0.103 0.072 100%
Table A2: Evaluation of neuron masking on clean test accuracy (CTA) and adversarial test accuracy (ATA) against k-step PGD
attacks.
CTA ATA(10-PGD)
ATA
(20-PGD)
ATA
(50-PGD)
ATA
(100-PGD)
ours 75.9% 60.1% 51.5% 39.7% 33.6%
random masking 77.0% 40.5% 28.7% 18.3% 14.3%
no masking 78.2% 41.7% 31.0% 18.8% 15.7%
adv. examples F (x0, t0) F (x′, t) & PSRs
t0: table lamp – t: studio coach
t0: airliner – t: seashore
Figure A8: Interpreting adversarial perturbations via CAM and
PSR. Image examples are from Figure 10. For PSR, only the top
70%most significant perturbed grids ranked by {si} (3) are shown.
The white and black colors represent the suppression-dominated
regions (ri < −1) and the promotion-dominated regions (ri >
1), respectively. The gray color corresponds to balance-dominated
perturbations (ri ∈ [−1, 1]).
